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Notes
EVIDENCE OF MARKET VALUE OF REAL
PROPERTY IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS
Due to increased governmental activity in the construction of
highways and hydroelectric power projects, and to the extension of
public utility transmission facilities, condemnation proceedings may
come to occupy a substantial portion of the trial docket in many
circuit courts throughout the Commonwealth. In almost all of these
cases, the only issue between the condemnor and the property owner
will be the amount which will fairly and adequately compensate the
latter for the loss he has sustained.' Where an entire tract is taken,
the measure of compensation is the fair market value of the property
when condemned. 2 Generally speaking, when less than an entire tract
is condemned, the landowner is entitled to recover the difference
between the fair market value of the entire property immediately
the fair market value of the remainder imbefore the taking and
3
mediately thereafter.
The purpose of this note will be to indicate by reference to
Kentucky decisions what evidence may be introduced for consideration by the jury in determining the fair market value of real property.
This may be divided into three broad categories: (1) factors relating
to the property condemned; (2) values and sales of comparable
property; and (3) opinion evidence.
FAcroRs PRTXAIM Nc TO THE PROPERTY CONDEMNED

There are certain factors relating to the property condemned
which may be entered as direct evidence of its market value or used
' Disputes as to authority to condemn and necessity of the taking seldom
reach the circuit court level. The reason for this is well illustrated by Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 177.081 (1) (1959) (hereinafter referred to as KRS) which provides in
The official order of the Department of Highways shall be conclusive
part:
of the public use of the condemned property and the condemnor's
decision as to the necessity for taking the property will not be disturbed in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion.
2 Madisonville, H. & E. R.R. v. Ross, 126 Ky. 138, 103 S.W. 330 (1907).
3 See Gulf Interstate Gas Co. v. Garvin, 303 S.W. 2d 260, 262 (Ky. 1957)i

Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 312 Ky. 782, 229 S.W. 2d 744 (1950). It should
be noted that there are several accepted formulas for ascertaining the amount
of compensation in partial taking cases, none of which has been exclusively
relied upon by the Kentucky courts. For a discussion of these rules and an analysis
of the Kentucky cases, see Note, 48 Ky. L.J. 124, 127-32 (1959).

NoTEs
to support opinion testimony thereto. Among these are the description
and location of the property; its adaptability to uses other than that
to which it is presently being put; its assessed evaluation for tax
purposes; and the gross receipts therefrom. On the other side there
are some factors, such as offers which have been made for the
property condemned, that cannot be considered in determining its
market value.
Description and Location of Property
In condemnation proceedings, either party may offer in evidence
a description of the property involved, its physical characteristics, its
location and surroundings, etc.4 For example, where the land condemned contains valuable mineral deposits, this fact may be introduced and its effect on the market value be considered, without
separation of the surface value from that of the minerals. 5
Demonstrative evidence may be used by either party to convey to
the jury the description and location of the property. In this regard,
colored pictures which fairly and accurately represent the appearance
of the property have been admitted the same as black-and-white
photographs."
Adaptability
In establishing the value of the property, the owner is not limited
to its market value for the use to which it was applied at the time of
condemnation. He may show its value for the highest and best use
to which it may reasonably be adapted at present or within the
foreseeable future.7 For example, though the property is now vacant
or devoted to general farming, if its location and topography is such
that in the near future it could have been sub-divided and sold for
commercial or residential lots, such evidence may be considered in
determining its market value.8 Again, the owner of residential property
may show its adaptability for commercial purposes, 9 provided such
use does not conflict with zoning or building restriction.
Ky. Rural Electric Co-op. Corp. v. Smith, 310 S.W. 2d 535 (Ky. 1958).
6Commonwealth v. Williams, 317 S.W. 2d 482 (Ky. 1958).
7East Ky. Rural Electric Co-op. v. Smith, 310 S.W. 2d 535 (Ky. 1958);
Kentucky Nat'l Park Comm'n. ex rel. Commonwealth v. Russell, 301 Ky. 187, 191
4East

5 Gulf Interstate Gas Co. v. Garvin, 303 S.W. 2d 260 (Ky. 1957).

S.W. 2d 214 (1945); West Virginia P. & T. R.R. v. Gibson, 94 Ky. 234, 21 S.W.
1055 8 (1893).
East Kentucky Rural Electric Co-op. v. Smith, supra note 7; David v.
Louisville & I. R.R., 158 Ky. 721, 166 S.W. 230 (1914); Chicago, St. L. & N. 0.
R.R. v. Rottgering, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1167, 83 S.W. 584 (1904); West Virginia P. &
T. R.R. v. Gibson, supra note 7.
9 Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 253 S.W. 2d 264 (Ky. 1952); Kentucky Util.
Co. v. Barnett, 252 S.W. 2d 12 (Ky. 1952).
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In Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Cornelius.10 the Kentucky court
stated in dicta that, although the owner may introduce evidence of
the adaptability of land to various uses, he may not state for what
particular purpose he intended to use the property nor what plans
he had for its future development. However, in Miller v. King," the
Cornelius case was distinguished and the strength of this statement
considerably weakened. In this case, the property owner was allowed
to testify that he intended to build his home on the land taken and
that the remaining land did not contain another suitable site.
Since the value of the property for the purpose to which it is
allegedly adaptable is invariably greater than the value for its present
use, condemnees may seek to invoke the adaptability doctrine where
the facts do not justify its application. Therefore, care should be
exercised by the court to require definite proof that the land is
suitable or adaptable for a particular use and that there is a market
or demand therefor in the vicinity where the property is located,
before admitting evidence of its value for such use.'2
Assessed Valuation for Tax Purposes
The value at which the land condemned has been listed by the
owner for tax purposes is admissible, 13 presumably as an admission
against interest.1a Furthermore, in Commonwealth v. Salyers14 the
court went so far as to allow evidence of the assessed valuation of a
tract owned by the condemnees which adjoined the land taken. However, in no event is such valuation conclusive on the question of
market value. 15 Even though the owner has listed the property for
taxation so far below its true value as to perpetrate a fraud on the
taxing authorities, this will not prevent him from receiving the fair
market value for his property.' 6
The value at which the property is assessed by the Tax Commis10232
11278

Ky. 282, 22 S.W. 2d 1033 (1929).
Ky. 151, 128 S.W. 2d 621 (1939).

12 See Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Million, 314 Ky. 137, 234 S.W. 2d
152 (1950); Hoskins v. Commonwealth, 290 Ky. 400, 161 S.W. 2d 169 (1943).
13Johnson County v. Boyd, 293 Ky. 337, 168 S.W. 2d 1019 (1948); Crittenden County v. Towery, 264 Ky. 606, 95 S.W. 2d 233 (1936); Davidson v.

Commonwealth, 249 Ky. 568, 61 S.W. 2d 34 (1933); Commonwealth v. Combs,
229 Ky. 627, 17 S.W. 2d 748 (1929); Louisville & N. Ry. v. White Villa Co., 155

Ky. 452, 159 S.W. 983 (1913).
13a Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 253 S.W. 2d 264 (Ky. 1952); cf. Franklin
County v. Bailey, 250 Ky. 528, 63 S.W. 2d 622 (1933).
'4 258 Ky. 837, 81 S.W. 2d 859 (1935).
15 Johnson County v. Boyd, supra note 13; Franklin County v. Bailey, supra
note 13a.
16 Johnson County v. Boyd, supra note 13.
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sioner without the concurrence of the owner is not competent
evidence. 17
Gross Receipts
In Kentucky Water Service v. Bird,'8 testimony of the property
owner as to the gross receipts from his farm for a five-year period
was approved as one of the elements to consider in fixing fair market
value. The court commented:
[W]e know of no better way to ascertain the fair market value
of land than to learn of its grois production-but not the profits made
on it. The first thing a prospective purchaser ... wants to know is
what the land will produce. . . . [P]roduction may as well be
measured in dollars as in crops grown, since they are reduced to
dollars.19

Along this line, it would logically follow that the owner of rental
property should be able to show the actual rents received for a reasonable period prior to the taking. These figures could then be capitalized
to arrive at the fair market value of the property. There is no Kentucky
authority for or against admission of such evidence, although it is
common practice in many other jurisdictions. 20 Further by analogy,
it would seem where a commercial establishment is condemned, the
owner should be allowed to introduce evidence of the volume of
business which he had done during a reasonable period preceding
condemnation. Again there is no Kentucky authority, favorable or

otherwise. 21
Replacement Cost
As a general rule the cost of replacing a structure located on the
property taken may not be introduced in evidence. This proposition
is well illustrated by Commonwealth v. Begley,22 where testimony of
carpenters as to the cost of constructing a new building similar to one
situated on the land condemned was held inadmissible. The court
there reasoned that the owner was entitled to compensation only to
the extent of the depreciated value of the property when it was
appropriated.
17 Commonwealth v. Wilson, 317 S.W. 2d 490 (Ky. 1958); Commonwealth
v. Williams, 317 S.W. 2d 482 (Ky. 1958); Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 253 S.W.
2d 264 (Ky. 1952).
18239 S.W. 2d 66 (1951).
19 Id. at 67-68. Compare Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Million, supra
note 12, where testimony that good tobacco land was worth one thousand dollars
per acre based on the return received on investment was held inadmissible.
20See 5 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 19.2, at 215 n. 15 (3d ed. 1952).
21 For an illustration of admission of such evidence see St. Louis Housing
Authority v. Bainter, 297 S.W. 2d 529, 534-35 (Mo. 1957).
22261 Ky. 812, 88 S.W. 2d 920 (1936).
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In certain partial taking situations, however, replacement cost of
a particular improvement may be allowed in evidence as bearing on
the market value of the property remaining. For example, in a recent
case, a strip of land condemned for a highway contained a septic tank
and lateral lines belonging to a nearby dwelling. The court approved
admission of the estimated replacement cost of these items as a
means of determining the decline in value of the remaining property
which resulted from the reduction in use of its kitchen and bathroom
facilities. 23
Offers for find Condemned
Evidence relative to offers made to the owner for the condemned
property has been consistently held inadmissible to establish market
value.2 4 When first confronted with this situation the Kentucky court
decided that, in view of the fact that the offer might not have been
genuine or might have been made by one financially unable to
perform, its probative value was so remote as to render it incompetent. 25 However, the policy behind exclusion of such evidence was
best revealed in Brock v. HarlanCounty2 6 where the court observed:
Among the reasons for the incompetency of such evidence are that
it is too uncertain, shadowy and speculative to form any solid basis
for determining the value of the land; the offer may not have been
made in good faith; it is a species of indirect evidence of the opinion
of the person making the offer as to value [i.e., hearsay]; there is no
opportunity to cross-examine the offeror; he may have wanted the
land for a particular purpose disconnected with its value; or he may
have been willing to engage in a speculation and take chances
that
some new use of the land might prove profitable in the end.2 7
VALUEs AND SAT S OF Coin'TAII

PROPERTY

Proof of the average market value of other property of like character in the same locality as the property condemned, and of the
prices at which such property has been sold within a reasonable time,

is admissible on two theories: (1) as independent substantive evidence
of the value of the property taken to which the comparison relates, and
23 Commonwealth v. Conatser, 329 S.W. 2d 48 (Ky. 1959).
See also
Commonwealth v. Means & Russell Iron Co., 299 Ky. 465, 185 S.W. 2d 960
(1945), where the court upheld a peremptory instruction to award the cost of
relocation of a water pipe which was necessitated by widening of the roadway.
24 See Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Million, supra note 12 (unnamed
persons had told witness they would give $400 @ acre for defendant's land);
Warfield
Natural Gas Co. v. Wright, 233 Ky. 378, 25 S.W. 2d 1036 (1930).
25
Commonwealth v. Combs, 229 Ky. 627, 17 S.W. 2d 748 (1929).
26 297 Ky. 113, 179 S.W. 2d 202 (1944).
27 Id. at 116, 179 S.W. 2d at 204.
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(2) as foundation evidence to support the opinion of an expert witness
as to such value.

28

Before evidence of the values and sales of other property can be
introduced, the party offering it must satisfy the court that the
property condemned is similar in all essential features to the property
with which it is to be compared. 29 For example, where the properties
involved are farmland, they should have the same topography, soil
type, improvements, degree of cultivation, etc. Where urban property
is compared, the buildings should be of similar design and construction,
and situated in the same relative location on lots of approximately
equal size.30 The preliminary determination by the trial court as to
the comparability of the respective properties is, to the extent that it
is based on undisputed testimony, a ruling of law, which the Court of
Appeals may set aside on review even though it is not clearly
erroneousaoa
A witness whose qualifications include experience in appraising or
dealing in real estate as a business may testify as to prices paid in
comparable sales of which he has no first-hand knowledge, if his information was acquired through the customary trade channels or by
methods recognized as standard by appraisers.30b
Evidence of prior sales of a portion of the property affected by
condemnation will be admitted only if they qualify as comparable sales
under the above requirements. Thus, testimony regarding the amount
received by the owner from the sale of lots off of a portion of his farm
some eight years before trial under conditions entirely different from
those existing when suit was brought was excluded. 3'

Prices Paid for Other Rights of Way
Testimony as to prices paid others in the neighborhood to obtain
rights of way for construction of the same project is inadmissible,
28

Stewart v. Commonwealth, 337 S.W. 2d 880 (Ky. 1960); Miller v. King,
278 Ky. 151, 128 S.W. 2d 621 (1939); Commonwealth v. Begley, 272 Ky. 289,
114 S.W. 2d 127 (1938); Kentucky Hydroelectric Co. v. Woodard, 216 Ky. 618,
287 S.W. 985 (1926); Big Sandy & Ky. R. Ry. v. Stafford, 207 Ky. 272, 268
S.W. 1071 (1925); Music v. Big Sandy & Ky. R. Ry., 163 Ky. 628, 174 S.W. 44
(1915); West Kentucky Coal Co. v. Dyer, 161 Ky. 407, 170 S.W. 167 (1914).
Accord: Bishop v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 218 Ky. 508, 291 S.W. 718 (1927).
2 Kentucky Hydroelectric Co. v. Woodard, supra note 28; West Kentucky
Coal Co. v. Dyer, supra note 28.
30 For a discussion of the factors to be considered in determining the comparability of urban property see Stewart v. Commonwealth, 337 S.W. 2d 880 (Ky.
1960).
30a Stewart v. Commonwealth, 337 S.W. 2d 880 (Ky. 1960).
30b Ibid.
3' Commonwealth v. Combs, 229 Ky. 627, 17 S.W. 2d 748 (1929); see also
Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Million, 314 Ky. 137, 234 S.W. 2d 152 (1951)
(sale of land on west side of far end of defendants farm).

KENTucKy LAw JouRNAL[

[Vol. 49,

even though a similarity of conditions between the tracts involved is
established. 2 Likewise, evidence of price paid for similar easements
in the vicinity by other condemnors is also incompetent.8 3 The court
regards such transactions as forced sales (i.e., not between a willing
buyer and a willing seller) which do not represent the fair market
34
value of the property.
OPnuIoN EVIDENCE

Introduction of opinion testimony by both expert and lay witnesses
as evidence of market value in condemnation proceedings is a wellestablished practice in Kentucky. 35 In areas where land infrequently
changes hands such testimony is often the only method available by
which real estate may be valued.3 6 Even where property in the
vicinity has been regularly bought and sold, what a particular tract
37
is worth is often a matter of opinoon.
Among those who qualify as expert witnesses are professional
appraisers and real estate dealers. As with experts in other fields, the
competency and strength of their testimony depends on the extent
of their training and experience in addition to their knowledge of land
values in the community and their personal observation of the property
condemned.38 For instance, where a witness testified that he was
engaged in general engineering, architectural and appraisal work, but
did not indicate the kind of appraisals or whether anyone had ever
accepted them, and was unable to recall any other sales in the
vicinity, his opinion was entitled to no consideration. 9
Non-experts who may testify include property owners who have
lived for several years in the neighborhood and are acquainted with
property values there. 40 Thus farmers may testify as to the value of
32

Stewart v. Commonwealth, 837 S.W. 2d 880 (Ky. 1960); Adams v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 38, 146 S.W. 2d 7 (1940); Commonwealth v. Crutchfield,
261 Ky. 272, 87 S.W. 2d 598 (1935); Commonwealth v. Combs, supra note 25;
Chicago,
St. L. & N. 0. Ry. v. Ware, 220 Ky. 778, 295 S.W. 1000 (1927).
33
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Mauk, 272 S.W. 2d 810 (1954) (evidence concerning prices paid by railroad in acquisition of right of way incompetent in
proceeding for condemnation of pipe-line easement); Kentucky-West Virginia Gas
Co. v. Hays, 288 Ky. 189, 37 S.W. 2d 17 (1931).
3
4 Stewart v. Commonwealth, supra note 32; Chicago, St. L. & N. 0. Ry. v.
Ware, supra note 32.
35Commonwealth v. Crutcher, 240 S.W. 2d 605 (Ky. 1951); Kentucky &
W. Va. Power Co. v. Saulsbury, 231 Ky. 788, 22 S.W. 2d 281 (1929); KentuckyTennessee
Light & Power Co. v. Shanklin, 219 Ky. 279, 292 S.W. 790 (1927).
3
6 Commonwealth v. Smith, 229 Ky. 345, 17 S.W. 2d 203 (1929).
37
Commonwealth v. Crutcher, supra note 35.
38
Commonwealth v. Begley, 272 Ky. 289, 114 S.W. 2d 127 (1938).
89
40 Ibid.

Himlar Coal Co. v. Kirk, 224 Ky. 383, 6 S.W. 2d 480 (1928).
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farm land, where they know how land is valued in the community. 41
Generally, the owner himself is a competent witness as to the value
of his own property.42 However, where he has no knowledge of its
43
market value, he may not testify thereto.
Although the Kentucky court has warned that lay opinion evidence
should be received with great caution, 44 it has generally viewed the
qualifications of a particular witness as going to the weight of his
testimony rather than its admissibility. 45 The strength of a nonexpert's opinion as to property value depends not on his credibility
nor his statement that he knows land values, but on his knowledge
of pertinent facts and his capability to draw a sound conclusion from
them.46 Thus, where a witness is unable to give facts which support
his estimate of the difference in market value before and after the
taking, 47 or where his opinion is based on speculative facts, 48 his
testimony is worthless and should be completely disregarded. This is
true even where the witness is the owner of the property involved. 49
However, where a witness is familiar with the condition and price of
land generally, and has viewed the property condemned, he may
testify regarding its value, though he is unaware of any sales in the
vicinity.50
The liberal attitude of the Kentucky court toward admission of nonexpert opinion evidence was best illustrated in Tennessee Gas Transmission Company v. Million.51 There a witness who had testified as
to the value of the condemned realty admitted on cross-examination
that he was not familiar with the property in question. Nevertheless
the court held that his testimony still had meagre probative value and
was not completely destroyed as a matter of law.
There is one pronouncement of the court which counsel who
contemplate the use of non-expert opinion witnesses should keep in
mind. Where the testimony of such witnesses is not supported by
sufficient facts, a verdict based thereon will be more readily set aside
41

Saulsberry v. Kentucky & W. Va. Power Co., 226 Ky. 75, 10 S.W. 2d 451

(1928).
42
Barron v. Phelps, 238 S.W. 2d 1016 (Ky. 1951).
40Ibid.
44

Commonwealth v. Begley, supra note 38.
45 Ibid.
40ibid; Kentucky Hydro-electric Co. v. Reister, 216 Ky. 303, 287 S.W. 357

(1926).
47 Ibid.
48 City of Hazard v. Eversole, 237 Ky. 242, 35 S.W. 2d 813 (1931).
49 Commonwealth
v. Combs, 244 Ky. 204, 50 S.W. 2d 497 (1932).
50 Damron v. Bartley,
302 Ky. 83, 194 S.W. 2d 73 (1946); Commonwealth

v. Smith, supra note 86.
51314 Ky. 137, 234 S.W. 2d 152 (1950).
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on appeal as against the weight of the evidence. 52 Counsel would
therefore be well advised to lay the best foundation possible for the
introduction of lay opinion evidence. Otherwise a favorable award,
though hard-earned and otherwise well-deserved, may be overturned
by the appellate court.
Commissionersas Witnesses
In many instances, particularly in the less populous counties, the
person or persons best qualified to serve as expert or lay opinion
witnesses may have been previously appointed as commissioners by
the county court to view the property condemned and to determine
the amount of compensation to which the owner is entitled.5 3 Such
persons are not prohibited from testifying in the circuit court trial
involving the same property. However, the Court of Appeals does
not approve of the practice of using the county court commissioners
as witnesses to the extent that on appointment they may anticipate
54
being engaged by the party favored by their appraisal.
In no event should a witness be allowed to state the amount
awarded by him as a commissioner, nor to undertake to explain the
basis of such award.5 5 Nor should counsel be permitted to mention
this award in his opening statement or allude to it during crossexamination of a commissioner-witness.55
Jury View
Previously, in all cases whether to send the jury to view the
premises was within the discretion of the trial court, whose decision
on this matter could be disturbed only where there was a clear abuse
of such discretion. 75 This rule was based on KYRS section 416.050, pertaining to the exercise of eminent domain by railroads and other public
utilities, which provides: "Upon the request of either party, the jury
52

Salt River Rural Electric Coop. Corp. v. Thurman, 275 S.W. 2d 780
(1955); Petroleum Exploration v. McGeorge, 225 Ky. 131, 7 S.W. 2d 821 (1928);
Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co. v. Shanklin, 219 Ky. 279, 292 S.W. 790

(1927).
5

3For an outline of the qualifications and duties of county court commissioners see KRS §§ 177.083 (state and federal highways), 416.020 (railroads),
416.100 (county roads), 416.240 (oil or gas pipelines).
54 Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Million, supra note 51.
55 Akers v. Kentucky & W. Va. Power Co., 216 Ky. 326, 287 S.W. 889
(1926); Webb v. Kentucky & W. Va. Power Co., 216 Ky. 64, 287 S.W. 232

(1926).

56 Commonwealth v. Crutcher, 240 S.W. 2d 605 (Ky. 1951). However both
in this case and in those cited in footnote 55, the error was held not prejudicial
where the recovery substantially exceeded the amount fixed by the commissioners.
57 Commonwealth v. Crutcher, supra note 56; Kentucky Nat'l Park Comn
ex rel. Conmmonwealth v. Russell, 301 Ky. 187, 191 S.W. 2d 214 (1945).
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may be sent by the court ... to view the land .... ,58 [Emphasis
added.] However, in 1952 KRS section 177.087 (1), covering condemnation for state and federal highways, was enacted. It provides
in part: "[The] jury, upon the application of either party, shall be
sent by the court .. .to view the land .... ."[Emphasis added.] It
is submitted that this provision constitutes a clear expression of legislative intent that a jury view be mandatory in highway condemnation
cases upon motion of either party.
If this is the case, the condition of the property at the time of trial
becomes of primary importance. Consequently, the condemnor will
likely strive either to get the trial over with before work is begun or
to delay it until after the project is completed and the appearance of
the property is more favorable to its cause. The landowner, on the
other hand, will try to have the trial during the course of construction
when the property is in its worst condition.
Where the jury has visited the property condemned, it is entitled
to form its own opinion as to the value of the land taken and the
damages to the remainder.6 9 Where the jury views the property after
construction is begun, its estimate is said to be of more than persuasive
influence.60 Despite the fact that the jury has viewed the premises,
and despite the general rule that assessment of damages is peculiarly
within the province of the jury, where the verdict is excessive and has
no reasonable basis in fact, it will be set aside on appeal. 61
It is fitting that this discussion of the evidence considered in
arriving at market value terminates with an examination of the view
of the premises by the jury. Through this procedure, its members are
given the opportunity to see first hand the conditions which have been
described to them from the witness stand. No wonder it is considered
to be one of the most decisive factors in determining the amount of
compensation awarded.
John T. Bondurant
S8KRS § 416.280 (1), which deals with an alternate procedure for con-

demnation by public utilities, provides: "[The] jury may be sent by the court
... to
5 view the land .... [Emphasis added.]
8aa
This was the interpretation recently given KRS § 177.087 by the Court of
Appeals in Commonwealth v. Farra, 338 S.W. 2d 696 (Ky. 1960).
59
6 Bailey v. Harlan County, 280 Ky. 247, 133 S.W. 2d 58 (1939).

o City of Middlesboro v. Chasteen, 285 Ky. 427, 148 S.W. 2d 295 (1941).
Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Teater, 252 S.W. 2d 674 (Ky. 1952).
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